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Abstract: From 1997 through 2003, the UN Oil for Food Program allowed Iraq to export
oil for humanitarian supplies. We hypothesize that Iraq deliberately set the price of its oil below
market prices to solicit bribes from oil buyers. By comparing the price gap between Iraqi oil and
its close substitutes during the Program to the gap prior to the Program, we nd evidence of
signicant underpricing. Our central estimate suggests that Iraq collected $1.3 billion in bribes
from underpricing its oil, or 2 percent of oil revenues. Underpricing is higher during periods of high
volatility in oil markets{when detection is more dicult{but declines after the UN limited Iraq's
ability to set the price of its oil.
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In response to Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, the United Nations imposed an embargo on
exports of Iraqi oil. To alleviate the economic hardship caused by the embargo, the UN
created the Oil for Food program that allowed Iraq to export oil in exchange for humanitarian
goods, largely food and medicine. The proceeds from the oil exports had to be deposited in
an escrow account controlled by the UN and could only be used to purchase humanitarian
supplies.
By some measures, the Oil for Food program was the largest humanitarian relief program
in world history. By the time the program ended in 2003, the Oil for Food program had
provided $32 billion in humanitarian supplies to Iraq. This makes the Oil for Food program
about 40 percent of the size of the Marshall Plan in absolute terms, and almost ve times
larger than the Marshall Plan on a per capita basis. There is evidence that the humanitarian
supplies provided by the program signicantly improved the standards of living of Iraq's
civilian population (especially children) during a period of severe need.1
While an important goal of the Oil for Food program was to provide humanitarian assis-
tance, the UN was also keen to prevent Iraq from obtaining resources that might be used to
purchase weapons or luxury goods. However, two key features of the Oil for Food program
potentially made it possible for Iraq to extract cash bribes and political favors from the
oil buyers. First, Iraq could freely choose the buyers of Iraqi oil. Second, until September
2001, Iraq had some discretion over the selling price of its oil. Therefore, particularly during
periods of high oil market volatility, Iraq potentially was able to deliberately set the price of
its oil below market prices and then choose buyers that were willing to pay bribes to obtain
the underpriced oil.
The objective of this paper is to measure these bribes. Clearly, due to its illicit nature,
nding direct evidence of the alleged cash payments and political favors { a paper trail, for
example { is dicult. Based on documents provided by Iraq's oil company, the CIA and a
commission headed by Paul Volcker estimate that Iraq received $230 million in cash bribes
through the strategic underpricing of its oil (CIA, 2004; IIC 2005b). However, this gure
may be an underestimate since it does not capture the monetary value of the political favors
provided by the oil traders (or their associates) in exchange for the underpriced oil, nor does
it include bribes that might have been paid to Iraqi ocials outside the oil company (for
example, to Saddam Hussein).
We take a dierent approach. Instead of looking for a paper trail, we use publicly available
data to uncover patterns suggestive of bribery.2 Specically, we measure the potential bribe
by the gap between the ocial selling price of Iraqi oil (i.e. the price paid to the Oil for
1 For example, during the years of the program, chronic malnutrition among children and the overall
incidence of vaccine-preventable diseases declined sharply (FAO and WFP, 2003).
2 Our analysis follows the approach taken by Di Tella and Schargrodsky (2003), Fisman and Wei (2004),
Olken (2004b), and Reinikka and Svensson (2004) in using patterns in prices and quantities to make inferences
about corruption.
1Food Program) and our estimates of the \market" price of Iraqi oil (i.e. the price of Iraqi
oil at the destination port, typically in Europe and the US, after subtracting shipping and
insurance costs). We then compare this gap to that observed before the program. If Iraqi
oil was underpriced in an eort to collect bribes, we expect to see two features in the data.
First, we expect to see a larger gap between the \market" price and the ocial price of Iraqi
oil during the Oil for Food program years than before the Program. In the years before the
Oil for Food program, Iraq had full control over its oil revenues and thus did not have any
incentive to underprice. Second, we expect the price dierence to become smaller and return
to its historical levels after September 2001. The reason is that in September 2001, the UN
adopted a \retroactive" pricing system under which Iraq was forced to set its selling price
retroactively based on the price actually observed in the market.
To illustrate our evidence, consider the gap between the ocial selling price of Basrah
Light{one of the two Iraqi oils{and the price of Arabian Light in the top panel of Figure
1. Arabian Light and Basrah Light are chemically very similar and are considered close
substitutes. The price gap indicates that underpricing of Basrah Light was modest in the
rst few years of the program, reached a peak in the 2000-2001 period, and declined after
the adoption of retroactive pricing in the fall of 2001. Notably, we nd a qualitatively
similar pattern when we measure the gap between ocial selling price of Iraqi oil and the
spot market price of Iraqi oil itself (after deducting shipping costs). This gap reects the
dierence between the price of Iraqi oil when the oil is rst sold at the Iraqi port under UN
supervision and the spot price of the same oil when it reaches its destination and is sold to a
rener in Europe or the US. The price paid to oil traders in these spot market transactions
presumably includes the cost of the bribe paid to the Iraqi regime. Unlike the evidence based
on competitors, this gap can not be explained by unobserved shocks to the relative demand
or relative supply of Iraqi oil.
Furthermore, consistent with the notion that price volatility in oil markets made it more
dicult for the UN to detect underpricing, we nd that underpricing was positively cor-
related with volatility in the period before retroactive pricing. In contrast, in the period
after retroactive pricing, when volatility should not matter, we nd no relationship between
underpricing and price volatility. In addition, we nd that underpricing was associated with
changes in the composition of oil buyers. While a multinational oil company might be re-
luctant to pay bribes, a small oil trader operating in Russia or Switzerland might be more
pliant. We nd a positive correlation between the degree of underpricing and the fraction of
oil sold to oil individual traders (rather than to large oil multinationals.)
Based on this evidence, we interpret the product of the change in the price gap (relative
to the price gap prior to the program) and the quantity of oil sold as an estimate of the rent
generated by this strategic underpricing scheme. Our best estimate is that Iraq generated
$3.5 billion in rents by deliberately underpricing its oil. These rents were presumably shared
between the oil buyers and the Iraqi government (in the form of favors and cash bribes). We
use a simple model of monopolistic competition among oil traders and data on the standard
2markup of oil traders to estimate the amount of bribes collected by Iraq. Our best estimate
suggests that Iraq collected 1.3 billion dollars in bribes. This amounts to 2 percent of the
total value of oil sold under the Oil for Food program, which does not appear to be very
large when compared to the typical amount of corruption that we observe in many projects
in developing countries.3
The rent-seeking mechanism we examine in this paper is not limited to Iraq, but it is
something we see in other countries, including the US. For example, there is some evidence
that energy companies extracting oil and natural resources from public land reported to the
US government that they received lower prices than the actual market price, thus depriving
the US Treasury of $700 million in royalties in 2005 (New York Times, 1/23/2006). This
underpricing of oil is remarkably similar to what we saw in Iraq during the Oil for Food
program. Historically, there has also been many cases in which public resources were sold
by US government ocials to private rms at below market prices in exchange for bribes in
the early 20th century (Glaeser, 2004).
The experience of the Oil for Food program also holds important lessons for other hu-
manitarian assistance programs. For example, Chad recently reached an agreement with a
consortium of oil companies led by ExxonMobil to develop its oil industry. To prevent the
oil revenues from being misused, Chad pledged that its revenues from the project were to be
deposited into an escrow account controlled by the World Bank. The program is remarkably
similar to the Oil for Food Program, and the World Bank is considering extending the same
model to other developing countries. The experience of the Oil for Food program highlights
the importance of institutional design in preventing initiatives such as the ExxonMobil-Chad
program from resulting in rent-seeking behavior. For example, in the case of the Oil for Food
Program, a relatively minor change in design (the introduction of retroactive pricing) appears
to have dramatically curtailed the scope for bribes.
Finally, we want to stress that there is evidence that the Oil for Food program provided
food and medicines to Iraqi civilians in a period of acute need, and reduced malnutrition and
malaria rates among children. Our paper does not measure the benets of the humanitarian
assistance provided by the Oil for Food Program, and therefore does not speak to the issue
of whether the program overall was successful.
2 Theory: Bribes and Underpricing of State-Sold Goods
In this section, we sketch a simple model to illustrate the incentive for Iraq to underprice
its oil. The model is borrowed from Shleifer and Vishny's (1992) analysis of bribes and
underpricing in state owned rms in the former Soviet Union. Glaeser (2004) has a similar
model, applied to the sale of public assets at below-market prices by local governments in
3 It is of course possible that Iraq was also obtaining illegal resources by exploiting the program in other
ways. For example, Iraq could have collected bribes by paying above market prices for the humanitarian
goods purchased by the Oil for Food program.
3the US. Suppose that the inverse demand curve for Iraqi oil is represented by D(Q), the cost
of producing oil by C(Q), and the ocial price of Iraqi oil by P official. The key assumption
is that Iraq does not keep any of the ocial revenues and places no value on the food and
medicine purchased by the Oil for Food Program. Therefore, instead of maximizing its
prots, Iraq maximizes prots net of the ocial revenues, or D(Q)Q C(Q) P officialQ.
Assuming for now that P official is exogenous and that bribery is not penalized, the rst
order condition is that the marginal revenue is equal to the sum of the marginal cost and
the ocial price: R0(Q) = C0(Q) + P official. This equilibrium is represented in Figure 2,
where P market represents the market price, Q the equilibrium quantity, and the shaded area
represents the rent created by underpricing.
What happens if the ocial price is not exogenous, but is endogenously set by Iraq? It
is easy to see that Iraq would benet from having the ocial price set as low as possible. In
the absence of any constraints on the ocial price, Iraq would set P official = 0. In reality,
the constraint that prevented Iraq from setting this price as low as it would have liked was
that the ocial price had to be approved by the UN at the beginning of each month. The
UN tried to make sure that the price was set as close as possible to the expected market
price over the month.
We therefore assume that Iraq can choose the ocial price, but that there is uncertainty
over the future market price and that Iraq is punished if the UN is reasonably certain that
the ocial price is deliberately set below market prices. Specically, we assume that the
expected punishment is an increasing convex function of the gap between the market price
and the ocial price divided by the standard deviation of the market price:
f[
P market   P official
SD
] (1)
We scale the price gap by the standard deviation of the market price to capture the idea
that it was more dicult for the UN to determine whether the proposed ocial price was
abnormally low in periods of high oil market volatility. In other words, the ex-post realization
of a positive price gap could reect deliberate underpricing, or could simply reect ex-
ante uncertainty over future prices. (More volatility implies more ex-ante uncertainty.)
With this assumption, the \optimal" ocial price chosen by Iraq is determined by Q =
f0[P market P official
SD ]. Intuitively, Iraq chooses the ocial price such that the marginal gain
from lowering the ocial price is equal to the marginal increase in the expected punishment
from lowering the ocial price.
There are two straightforward implications of this model. A rst implication is that
increased volatility lowers the marginal probability of detection for any given price gap.
Therefore, Iraq will choose to lower the ocial price in response to an increase in price
volatility. Intuitively, higher price volatility implies greater uncertainty over whether a given
price gap reects cheating or whether it simply reects the higher volatility in the market
price. Therefore, if our story of underpricing and bribes is correct, we expect that Iraq will
4take advantage of the greater uncertainty due to higher volatility to lower the ocial price
of its oil. We will provide empirical evidence in support of this hypothesis in section 5.1.
A second implication has to do with buyer heterogeneity. While the cost of detection
was probably low for many obscure individual traders, it was high for large reputable multi-
nationals. One would expect the rst group to be more likely to pay bribes than the second.
Under this scenario, some of the rent was appropriated by reputable buyers in the form of
low oil prices. Obviously Iraq would prefer to deal only with individual traders willing to
pay bribes. However, it is possible that, in some periods, the supply of Iraqi oil exceeded the
demand from non-reputable buyers or that Iraq had to deal at least in part with reputable
oil companies to minimize international scrutiny. We will examine this hypothesis in Section
5.2.
3 Empirical Evidence on Underpricing
In this section, we document the extent by which Iraqi oil was underpriced when compared
to the market price of several comparison crude oils. First, we compare the ocial selling
price of Iraqi crude oils to the price of its closest substitutes: Arabian Light, Arabian Medium,
and Urals. Second, we compare the ocial selling price of Iraqi crude oils with the spot
market price of Iraqi crude oil itself. The data used are described in the Data Appendix.
3.1 Close Competitors
Iraq produces two types of crude oil, known as Basrah Light and Kirkuk. The closest
substitute of Basrah Light is Arabian Light, a crude oil produced in Saudi Arabia. In turn,
the Russian Urals crude oil is widely regarded as the closest substitute for Kirkuk. Because
these oils are physically so similar, their prices are almost perfectly correlated. In the years
before the program, the correlation between the price of Arabian Light and Basrah Light is
0.993, while the correlation between the price of Kirkuk and Urals is 0.985.4
Another way to assess the comparability of Arabian Light and Urals to the two Iraqi oils
is to plot the price gap between the comparison oils and the Iraqi ocial prices. The top
panel in Figure 1 plots the dierence between the price of Arabian Light and the ocial
selling price of Basrah. The bottom panel shows the dierence between the market price of
Urals and the ocial selling price of Kirkuk. The rst vertical line marks the beginning of
trading under the Oil for Food Program (tenth week of 1997) and the horizontal line is the
4 The market price of Arabian Light and ocial prices of the two Iraqi oils are quoted as a fob price, while
the market price of Urals is typically quoted as a delivered price in the port of Augusta (Italy). To compare
the market price of Urals to the ocial selling price of Kirkuk, we convert the delivered price of Urals in
Italy to a fob price by subtracting oil tanker rates from the Black Sea to Italy. The average transportation
cost between 1989 and 2002 is $.87. During the program years, transportation costs uctuate between .58
in 1999 and 1.22 in 2000. Transportation costs are slightly higher during the Oil for Food program years.
A regression of transportation cost on a dummy for the Oil for Food years yields .10 (.04). Transportation
costs are also positively correlated with the price of oil.
5average dierence for the years before the Oil for Food Program. As can be seen, the price
gap between Basrah and Arabian Light averages zero in the years prior to the Oil for Food
program. The price gap between Kirkuk and Urals in the 1980s is also zero. Together with
the almost perfect correlation in the price level, the absence of a price gap provides some
reassurance that Arabian Light and Urals are reasonably close substitutes for the Iraqi oils.
After the Oil for Food Program is introduced, this dierence is clearly larger for Basrah:
the gap averages $2 in 1997 and 1998, and climbs above $5 between 2000 and 2001. Notably,
after retroactive pricing is introduced in September 2001, the dierence drops quickly to its
historical level (the second vertical line in Figure 1 indicates the beginning of retroactive
pricing). There is also some evidence that Kirkuk was underpriced from 2000-2001, albeit
by not as much as Basrah.
We can quantify the average price gap by estimating the following regression:
Pt =  + Programt + t (2)
where t indexes week, Pt is the dierence between the market price of the comparison
crude and the ocial selling price of the relevant Iraqi crude, and Programt is an indicator
variable for periods of the Oil for Food Program in which sales of Iraqi oil took place (March
1997-December 2002). The excluded category, captured by the intercept, is the period
before the Oil for Food Program (in most cases it includes years 1980-1996). The coecient
 measures the average change in the price dierence during the Program relative to the
historical baseline before the program. Because the gures indicate that the price gaps vary
signicantly between 1997 and 2002, we also estimate model that allow the gap to dier in
dierent periods:
Pt =  + 1Program1t + 2Program2t + 3Program3t + t (3)
where Programjt is an indicator variable for the jth sub-period of the Oil for Food Program
(for example: j = 1997-1999, 2000-2001, 2002).
One concern is that the error term t might be autocorrelated. The residual is the
dierence between shocks to Iraqi oil and shocks to its competitors. Serial correlation might
occur if the shocks to the demand and supply of Iraqi oil relative to its competitors are
serially correlated. To account for possible serial correlation we estimate models where the
error structure is assumed to be autocorrelated up to ve lags and heteroskedastic (Newey
and West, 1987).5
Table 1 quanties the visual impression one gets from Figure 1 by presenting estimates of
 (from equation 2). The rst column presents the estimates of the change in the gap between
5 We have also experimented with models where the error structure is assumed to be autocorrelated up
to ten lags, and found that results do not change signicantly. Because of the gaps in our series, we have also
experimented with the Baltagi and Wu (1999) estimator for cases where the observations that are unequally
spaced over time and the residual follows an AR(1) process. Results are similar. We have also experimented
with models where we cluster the standard errors at the trimester-year level. This is not ideal, because it
assumes no correlation between shocks in dierent trimesters.
6Arabian Light and Basrah. The estimate in the top panel indicates that the underpricing
averaged $2.44 dollars a barrel during the Oil for Food Program years (relative to the years
before the program).6 Because the price gaps appear to vary over time, in the bottom panel
we show separate estimates for three sub-periods (equation 3). These estimates indicate that
the price gap was signicantly dierent from zero in the 1997-1999 period, reaches a peak in
the 2000-2001 period, and declines in 2002.
An alternative substitute for Basrah Light is the Saudi crude oil Arabian Medium. While
the Arabian Light has historically been the closest substitute of Basrah light, there is some
evidence that the quality of Basrah Light became much closer to that of Arabian Medium by
the end of the program.7 For this reason, in column 2 we present a comparison based on the
price of Arabian Medium. We nd that the estimated underpricing averaged $1.24 dollars
a barrel during the Oil for Food Program years (relative to the years before the program).
This estimate is smaller than the comparison based on Arabian Light (column 1), which
suggests that part of the increase in the price gap between Arabian Light and the ocial
selling price of Basrah Light after 1997 may be due to the deteriorating quality of the Iraqi
oil. Finally, the estimate based on the comparison between Urals and Kirkuk (column 3)
suggests an average underpricing of only $0.69 dollars a barrel.8
Based on the estimates of these price gaps, we can calculate the rents created by the
underpricing of Iraqi oil. Specically, we estimate these rents as the product of quantity sold
in each week and the dierence between that week's price gap and the baseline price gap:
I =
X
t
[(Pt   ^ )  Qt] (4)
where Pt is the actual price gap in a given week, ^  is the estimate of the average price
gap in the years before the Program (the intercept in equation 2), and Qt is the quantity of
the relevant Iraqi oil sold that week. This estimate indicates that the underpricing of Iraqi
oil created $2.28 billion to $4.12 billion in rents for buyers of Basrah Light (depending on
whether Arabian Light or Medium is used a comparison) and $0.76 billion in rents for buyers
of Kirkuk. These rents were presumably split between the Iraqi regime and oil buyers.9
6 Specically, this is the gap from the 10th week of 1997 through the last week of 2002 relative to the 15
years prior to the program.
7 Authors' personal communication with Mr. Maurice Lorenz (American oil overseer for the Oil for Food
program from 1997-1998).
8 The estimated AR(1) parameters in column 1 and 3 are 0.88 and 0.62.
9 For completeness, we have also investigated the gap between the ocial price of the Iraqi oils and the
market price of West-Texas Intermediate (WTI) and Brent. WTI and Brent are two crude oils widely used
as benchmarks for the world price of oil. The patterns of the price gap are shown are generally similar to
the patterns in gure 1 (See Hsieh and Moretti, 2005). We also obtain similar results when we examine the
price gap between Iraqi oils and four other sour crude oils: Iranian Light, Oman, Dubai, and Venezuelan
Tijuana.
73.2 Market Price of Iraqi Oil
We now turn to our second measure of the market value of Iraqi oil: the spot market
price of Iraqi oil itself. That is, we compare the ocial selling price of Iraqi oil to the spot
market price of the same oil. Oil traders that received Iraqi oil contracts sold these contracts
in spot markets in Europe and the US. The price paid to oil traders in these spot market
transactions presumably includes the cost of the bribe paid to the Iraqi regime. After an
adjustment for transportation costs, the gap between the spot market price and the ocial
selling price should be the most direct measure of underpricing. However, the spot market
data of Iraqi oil is of lower quality than the data on the spot market prices of the other four
comparison crude oils. 10
Figure 3 shows the price dierence between the market price of Iraqi crude and its own
ocial selling price. The top panel is for Basrah. As can be seen, the overall picture
is qualitatively similar to Figure 1. The gure suggests that underpricing was somewhat
limited from 1997-1999, large from 2000-2001, and declined after September 2001. The
bottom panel is for Kirkuk. The graph is noisier than the previous gures, and the evidence
for underpricing for Kirkuk appears therefore weaker than that for Basrah. We do not know
exactly why the documented price gap appears to be larger for Basrah than for Kirkuk.11
Table 2 quanties the magnitude of the price gap. Looking at the overall estimates,
the point estimates are 1.64 and 0.29 for Basrah and Kirkuk, respectively. The estimate
for Basrah is remarkably close to the estimate based on the comparison between Arabian
Medium and Basrah (column 2 in Table 1), while the estimate for Kirkuk is lower than the
previous estimate.12
Estimates by period show a pattern similar to the one shown in Table 1, with the peak
of the underpricing reached in the 2000-2001 period. Although the patterns over time are
generally similar, it appears that the ndings in column 1 and 3 of Table 1 may be an
overestimate of the true magnitude of the price gap. However, the estimate of underpricing
based on the comparison of Basrah Light with Arabian Medium is remarkably similar to
the estimate obtained from the spot market price of Basrah Light. Estimates of the illegal
revenues are $3.03 billion and $0.48 billion, respectively.
10 In particular we have data on the spot market price of Kirkuk and Basrah from three independent
sources (ICISLOR, Platts, and Petroleum Argus; see the Data Appendix). But no data source covers the
entire period. To construct a series for the spot market price of the two Iraqi crude oils over the entire time
period, we simply take the average of the price gaps from the data sources available in each week.
11 We oer a potential explanation in Section 4.
12 The estimated AR(1) parameters are .78 and .54. Clustered standard errors are respectively .28 and
.15. We have also re-estimated all the models assuming that the error structure is autocorrelated up to 10
lags. The standard errors increased slightly, without changing the qualitative conclusions on signicance
of the coecients. For example, the standard errors in column 1 to 3 in Table 1 become .32, .32 and .16.
Standard errors in column 1 and 2 of Table 2 become .25 and .13. We have re-estimated the models in
Tables 1 and 2 limiting the pre-program samples to be the same in both tables. The estimates do not change
signicantly. To check robustness, we re-estimated all the models controlling for the price of Brent. Results
did not change very much. For example, estimates in column 1 to 3 in Table 1 become 2.47 (.24), 1.19 (.22),
.65 (.12). Estimates in column 1 and 2 of Table 2 became 1.25 (.16) and .27 (.13).
8Our estimates of underpricing match fairly well the only existing piece of documentary
evidence of underpricing. This documentary evidence is from a report by the commission
headed by Paul Volcker, and refers to ve purchases of Kirkuk crude oil (for a total of
7.3 million barrels) by an oil trading company called the Africa Middle East Petroleum
Company (AMEP). Based on written documentation on the price paid by AMEP to Iraq
and on the price received by AMEP on the spot market by reners (mostly by Shell), the
Volcker commission calculates that Kirkuk was underpriced by an average of $.25 in these
ve cases (IIC, 2005a). Our estimates based on the comparison between the OSP price for
Kirkuk and the market price for Kirkuk in the ve three-week windows centered around the
date of the AMEP sales is $.27, which is remarkably consistent with the evidence provided
by the Volcker commission.
In an ideal world, we would want to have the kind of documentary evidence compiled by
the Volcker commission for the AMEP oil sales for all 1,300 oil contracts during the Oil for
Food Program, but this would be prohibitively costly. As an alternative, our estimates of
underpricing have the advantage of being easy to compute and for relying only on publicly
available market data. In addition, it is worth noting that the ve transactions examined
in detail by the Volcker commission do not appear to be representative of the underpricing
during the Program. First, the AMEP contracts were for Kirkuk, and we have shown that
underpricing was much less prevalent with Kirkuk than with Basrah. Second, three of the
sales are from the 1998-1999 period, where underpricing was generally low.
4 Alternative Explanations
In the previous section, we have presented evidence that there seems to have been sig-
nicant underpricing of Iraqi oil (especially of Basrah). We interpret the underpricing as a
deliberate attempt by Iraq to extract bribes from the oil buyers. Of course, this is not the
only possible interpretation. In this section, we analyze whether alternative interpretations
are consistent with the evidence and ultimately conclude that they are not.
(1) Stigma Associated with Buying Iraqi Oil. It is possible that in the years after
the rst Gulf War, dealing with the Iraqi regime carried a stigma in the eyes of the world
public opinion. Large multinational oil companies interested in preserving their reputation
might have been particularly sensitive to this, and thus chosen not to purchase Iraqi oil. If
this is true, the demand for Iraqi oil might have declined relative to the demand of its close
competitors. This decline in relative demand{not strategic underpricing aimed at obtaining
bribes{could in theory explain the lower prices of Iraqi oil relative to its competitors.
However, this hypothesis is not consistent with three pieces of evidence. First, it is
dicult to reconcile with the existence of a gap between the market price of Iraqi oil and its
own ocial selling price. Any stigma associated with purchasing Iraqi oil should aect both
9the ocial selling price and the market price of Iraqi oil. If the stigma eect was the only
explanation of underpricing, we should not see underpricing when we compare the market
price of Iraqi oil to its own ocial selling price. Second, in order to explain the decline
in underpricing after the introduction of retroactive pricing, the stigma hypothesis would
require a signicant improvement in the perception of the Iraqi regime in the eyes of the
world public opinion after September 2001.
Third, underpricing does not appear to be more prevalent during periods when world
public attention was focused on Iraq.13 One way to directly quantify such attention is to
measure the coverage of Iraq in the media. Figure 4 plots the total number of articles
that appeared in the New York Times and the Wall Street Journal between 1996 and 2002
that contain the word \Iraq" (top panel), \Iraq" and \Weapons" (middle panel) and \Iraq"
and \Human Rights" (bottom panel). As can be seen, there was a spike in news coverage
about Iraq in 1998 and 1999 (largely on weapon inspections), but this was a period of
relatively low underpricing. There also does not appear to be any particular decline in the
number of articles after September 2001, nor does it show any particular increase in the peak
underpricing period in 2000-2001. 14
(2) Decline in Iraq Shipping Facilities An alternative explanations for the lower
prices commanded by Iraqi oil is the decline in Iraq shipping facilities. Years of embargo
are likely to have curtailed Iraqi access to new technologies and to the spare parts necessary
to keep its oil terminals up to date. As a consequence, it is possible that the decline in the
price of Iraqi oil simply reects longer delays experienced by oil tankers loading oil at Iraqi
port, or higher variance of these delays. Both an increase in mean or an increase in variance
in loading time would make Iraqi oil relatively less attractive and could therefore cause a
decline in its relative price.
Can decline in shipping facilities explain the underpricing? It seems unlikely. First, there
is no particular reason for why the ports should have improved substantially after September
2001. More importantly, to measure delays experienced by oil tankers we collected data on
the arrival and departure date of every ship that loaded oil at the Basrah oil terminal, which
13 In particular, the UN was focused on Iraq in 1998 and 1999 due to the struggle over the weapons
inspections regime. Yet, this was a period when underpricing was relatively low. In contrast, the peak
underpricing period apparently began in the May 2000 when the UN did not have its eyes on Iraq, but
rather was focused on two crises in Africa: the kidnapping of UN peacekeepers in Sierra Leone and an
impending war between Ethiopia and Eritrea. In May 2000 the Security Council was so preoccupied with
events elsewhere in the world that it did not have time to authorize a routine renewal of the Oil for Food
program, and it was precisely in May 2000 that the peak underpricing period began. Platt's Oilgram News
(6/1/2000) reports \With the UN Security Council overloaded with work on the world's crisis spots this
week, members have decided to delay a vote on the rollover of the Iraq oil-for-food program until next
week."
14 In the top panel in Figure 4, a regression of underpricing on number of articles yields - .001 (.001).
In the middle panel, this regression yields -.030 (.023). In the bottom panel, it yields -.005 (.003). Results
based on the number of rst-page articles or the total number of words in articles about Iraq are similar.
10is the main port facility in Iraq.15 If shipping facilities deteriorated, we should see an upward
trend in the number of days that it takes to load an oil tanker, holding constant the number
of ships. If port deterioration can explain underpricing, we should also see that periods
when the delays are longest or when the variance in delay is highest are also periods when
underpricing is largest.
Figure 5 shows that there does not seem to be any particular trend in the loading time
in the ve years under consideration. It also indicates that variation in underpricing is not
positively correlated with changes in the length of time it takes to load tankers, or change
in its variance. A regression of underpricing on average waiting time yields a negative but
statistically insignicant coecient (coe: -.40; std error .26). A regression of underpricing
on the standard deviation of waiting time calculated across all shipments in the relevant
month yields an insignicant coecient (coe: -.05; std error .26). These results do not
change if we control for number of ships to account for possible crowding at the port or if
we use as dependent variable delays divided by tonnage to account for heterogeneity in the
sizes of the tankers.
(3) Decline in the Quality of Iraqi Oil A decline in the price of Iraqi oil could in
theory be explained by a decline in the relative quality of Iraqi oil. For example, we have
suggested that although Basrah Light has historically been virtually identical to Arab Light,
there is some evidence that the quality of Basrah Light fell relative to Arab Light over the
course of the Program. Therefore, the price gap between Arab Light and the ocial selling
price of Basrah is likely to overstate the true degree of underpricing.
However, our best estimate of underpricing is based on the comparison of the ocial price
of Iraqi oil and the market price of the same oil. This is our best estimate of underpricing
because the two prices are for exactly the same oil, albeit at dierent stages of the distribution
process. Therefore, the gap between Iraq's ocial selling price and the market price of Iraq
oil are clearly are not contaminated by possible changes in oil quality.
Finally, we note again that the price gap between Iraqi oil and other oils drops to zero
after the introduction of retroactive pricing, and there is no reason to believe that quality
dierences abruptly ended in September 2001.
(4) Increased Supply It is in theory possible that the fall in the ocial price of Iraqi
was a consequence of a deliberate eort by the Iraqi regime to sell more oil. Specically, if
Iraq valued the humanitarian supplies purchased by the Oil for Food Program, it might have
chosen to sell more oil to increase the resources owing into the program at a time when the
marginal utility of consumption was particularly high. If the demand curve for Iraqi oil is
not perfectly elastic, the increased supply of oil will result in a decline in the price of Iraqi
oil.
15We purchased this data from Lloyds of London.
11Two pieces of evidence argue against this hypothesis. First, although it is probably less
than innite, the demand for Iraqi oil is likely to be very elastic.16 If the demand curve for
Iraqi oil is very elastic, the large price dierences documented in the previous section (more
than $1 on average, with peaks of up to $4) would imply enormous increases in quantity
sold. However, we simply do not observe such large variations in quantity sold. Figure 7
presents a scatter-plot of the price gap and the quantity sold of Basrah (top panel) and
Kirkuk (bottom panel). If the episodes of underpricing were triggered by an outward shift
in the relative supply of Iraqi oil, we should see a positive relationship between the price
gap and the quantity. However, the relationship between the price dierence and quantity is
either not statistically dierent from zero or negative. 17 Second, the supply hypothesis can
not explain the evidence of underpricing even when we measure the gap between the market
price of Iraqi oil and its ocial selling price.
(5) Market Volatility Next, we address the impact of oil market volatility on our
measures of underpricing. Until September 2001, the price of Iraqi oil was set a month in
advance and this price was stipulated as a xed discount to the future price of benchmark
oils. Since the future price of the benchmark oils is not known at the time the buyer enters
into a contract to purchase Iraqi oil, the buyer of Iraqi oil bears the risk of any price volatility.
This volatility presumably lowers the value of an Iraqi oil contract.
Could this risk explain the lower price of Iraqi oil relative its competitors that we have
documented in the years before September 2001? It seems unlikely. The reason is that
the competitors oils are priced in a way similar to Iraqi oil. Specically, Arab Light, Arab
Medium, and Urals are priced at a discount to the future price of world benchmark oils. The
price of Iraqi oil sold by oil traders is also quoted at a discount to the relevant benchmark
oils.18 Therefore, prior to September 2001, volatility in oil markets should have exactly the
same eect on the comparison oils as on the ocial price of Iraqi oil.
It is the introduction of retroactive pricing in September 2001 that should have lowered
the value of an ocial Iraqi oil contract relative to its competitors. The reason is that after
the introduction of retroactive pricing, buyers of Iraqi oil learn the pricing formula only after
the oil had been loaded onto the ships. Therefore, the observed price gap after September
2001 is likely to overstate the \risk-adjusted" price gap between Iraqi oil and the comparison
oils. This could in part explain why the observed decline in underpricing is not sharper after
16 How elastic is the price elasticity of demand for Iraqi oil? In Hsieh and Moretti (2005), we use an
exogenous change in the supply of Iraqi oil to show that the elasticity of demand of Iraqi oil is quite high.
17 A regression of quantity sold on the price gap yields a coecient (std. error) of -2.17 (4.00) for Basrah
and -8.61 (4.34) for Kirkuk. We note, however, that is of course possible that these coecients are biased,
if unobserved shocks to the demand of Iraqi oil are systematically correlated with changes in its supply.
18 The pricing of Saudi oils is identical to that of Iraqi oils. That is, the prices are set at a discount to
world benchmark oils, where the relevant discount and benchmark used varied depending on the destination
of the oil. The discounts obviously diered from that used by Iraqi oils, but the benchmarks oils used are
exactly the same. In turn, since Urals is sold on a delivered basis in Italy, it is priced at a xed discount to
the benchmark oil on the day the oil is delivered in Italy. However, this price is obviously not known when
the buyer of Urals enters into a contract to purchase the Russian oil.
12September 2001. To get a sense of how much this may matter, we use options to value this
risk. We purchased daily options data from NYMEX for the period 1998-2002 and run a
regression of the call options price on the strike price and the strike date to estimate the
price of a one month call option for a strike price equal to the actual realized value of the oil
price one month in the future.19 Our estimate suggests that the price gap after September
2001 is likely to be overstated by 30 cents. In other words, in the risk-adjusted version of
Figure 1, the underpricing line should be 30 cents lower after September 2001.
Finally, we note that our underpricing estimates are largely unchanged when we introduce
controls for oil market volatility 20. In the next Section, we show that volatility does aect
underpricing, but only during the Oil for Food period.
(6) Reduced Eort The ocial revenues of the Oil for Food Program were largely
spent on humanitarian supplies. However, there were periods in which these funds were not
spent due to administrative delays in the UN. Therefore, if Iraq did value these humanitarian
supplies, but was frustrated by the fact that some of these funds were not spent, Iraq may
have chosen to reduce its eort to obtain the best price for its oil. According to this \reduced
eort" interpretation, Iraq did not underprice in an eort to extract bribes, but because the
UN was not spending the ocial revenues in a timely manner. To investigate this possibility,
we collected data on the amount of undisbursed funds in the UN escrow account. We focus
on the fraction of revenues that is not spent for humanitarian aid in Iraq in each 6-months
period over the total oil revenues in that period as a measure of the implicit tax-rate faced by
Iraq.21 If this argument is correct, we should observe that higher tax rate are associated with
lower eort and therefore higher underpricing. Figure 6 shows that this does not appear to
be the case. Overall, the fraction of undisbursed funds is negatively, not positively, correlated
with underpricing. The correlation is -0.46.
5 Comparative Statics: Market Volatility and Type of
Buyers
In this section we investigate two implications of our hypothesis. First, we test whether
underpricing was higher in periods of high price volatility, and lower in periods of price
stability. Second, we test whether episodes of underpricing are associated with a decline in
the share of major oil multinationals among the oil buyers.
19 Specically, we ran a regression of the log of the option price on a quadratic in the log of the strike
price and in the length of the strike date.
20 For example, estimates in column 1 to 3 in Table 1 became 2.45 (.25), 1.19 (.25), .61 (.12). Estimates
in column 1 and 2 of Table 2 became 1.49 (.21) and .32 (.13).
21These data are available only every 6 months
135.1 The Relationship Between Underpricing and Price Volatility
In this subsection, we propose a specication check based on the notion that monitoring
is easier when volatility is low. Until September 2001, Iraq could set the price of its oil,
but the price had to be approved by the UN. In particular, each month, Iraq set the price
of its oil for transactions that would take place the following month. This price had to be
approved by the UN, who had to ascertain that the price set was as close as possible to the
expected market price for the following month. Since there are no future prices for Iraq oil,
this was not an easy task for the UN overseers, especially in periods when world oil markets
were volatile. When the price of oil on the world markets was stable, predicting the future
price of oil was relatively easy. However, in periods when the price of oil was very volatile,
predicting the future price of oil became much harder. This suggests that it should have
been easier for Iraq to get away with a low price in periods characterized by high volatility
in world oil prices. It was harder for the UN overseers to object to a low price in periods
where the future price of oil was very uncertain.
After September 2001, the UN changed the way Iraqi oil was priced. Specically, after
this date, the price of Iraqi oil was not known until after the oil had already been loaded on
the oil tankers. That is, the price of Iraqi oil was set by the UN only after the UN could
observe the actual price in the market. Therefore, the relationship between underpricing and
volatility presumably changed after the introduction of retroactive pricing, since retroactive
pricing eectively forced Iraq to set prices equal to the actual market price, irrespective of
volatility.
If this is true, we should observe two features in the data. First, in the period before
the introduction of retroactive pricing, we should see that our estimates of underpricing are
higher in weeks of high oil price volatility. Second, in the period after the introduction of
retroactive pricing, we should see that our estimates of underpricing are not correlated with
volatility. Finding a correlation between underpricing and volatility after the adoption of
retroactive pricing would cast doubt on the validity of the interpretation of this specication
test.
Table 3 presents estimates from four regressions of underpricing on market volatility.
Because the UN overseers used the price of Brent (a widely used international benchmark
price) as a reference price for shipments going to Europe, we measure volatility on the world
oil market as the standard deviation of the price of Brent in the ten weeks preceding the
observed transaction.22 (Note that the dependent variable is of course a price dierence,
while the dependent variable is volatility in the price level.)
The table shows a pattern that matches remarkably well our predictions. In the period
before retroactive pricing (September 2001), there is a positive association between our
estimates of underpricing and volatility, both for Basrah and Kirkuk.23 To have a sense
22 Using 5 weeks does not signicantly change the results.
23 This association is stronger for Basrah than for Kirkuk. One possible explanation for this pattern is
that Basrah is typically shipped to the US while Kirkuk is exported to European markets. Since it takes
14of the magnitude of the coecient, consider that a move from the 25th percentile of the
standard deviation distribution to the 75th percentile (i.e. from a standard deviation of
0.89 to one of 1.77) would be associated with an increase in underpricing equal to $0.80
for Basrah and $0.26 for Kirkuk. Such an eect seems quantitatively large, especially for
Basrah. Notably, after retroactive pricing is introduced, the correlation between underpricing
and volatility disappears. The coecients in the second row for both Basrah and Kirkuk are
not statistically dierent from zero.24
Overall, it appears that it was easier for Iraq to underprice its oil in period of high price
volatility than in periods of price stability. This nding is interesting for three reasons.
First, it lends further credibility to our interpretation of underpricing. Second, it is useful in
explaining the timing of the documented underpricing. Why was Iraq able to dramatically
expand its underpricing in the spring of 2000? The evidence on the link between volatility
and underpricing suggests that part of the answer may lie with the increased volatility of
the price of oil in world markets. The months of peak underpricing (2000 and the rst half
of 2001) are month characterized by high volatility in the price of oil markets. By contrast,
volatility was much lower in 1997, 1998 and 1999. Third, one might be in theory concerned
that after the September 11 terrorist attacks, the Iraqis were worried that the U.S. could
use the attacks as an excuse for heightened anti-Iraq actions and decided that continuing to
solicit bribes from the Oil-For-Food program was too risky. We think that a more direct and
likely explanation is that the end of underpricing was due to the adoption of the retroactive
pricing scheme in September 2001. The nding that after retroactive pricing, the correlation
between underpricing and volatility disappears is more consistent with our interpretation.
5.2 Underpricing and the Composition of Oil Buyers
In this subsection, we investigate the relationship between underpricing and the impor-
tance of major oil companies as a fraction of Iraqi oil buyers. We stress that this evidence
is very indirect and only suggestive, although it is consistent with the evidence presented
so far. There were three types of buyers of Iraqi oil. First, there were major multinational
oil companies that operate in Iraq as well as in many other oil markets. Examples include
Shell, BP, Total (France), Agip (Italy), and Gasprom (Russia). On the other extreme, there
were many individual dealers with no connection to reputable companies. These dealers
were typically from countries such as Russia, Ukraine, or Switzerland, that are not major
oil importers. Third, there were small but legitimate oil companies (not major multination-
4-6 weeks for Basrah to reach the US from the Persian Gulf and only a few days for Kirkuk to reach its
nal destination in Europe (Kirkuk is shipped from a Turkish port on the Mediterranean), price volatility is
likely to increase uncertainty about the nal market price at the destination port by more for Basrah than
for Kirkuk.
24 We also estimated models that include the price of Brent among the controls. The coecients for
Basrah become .445 (.174) and .122 (.131), while the coecient for Kirkuk become .368 (.113) and -.0000
(.151). When we include year xed eects, the coecients for Basrah drop to .248 (.094) and .027 (.135),
while the coecient for Kirkuk become .346 (.093) and -.007 (.138).
15als). We expect that, while a major multinational oil company might nd it dicult to pay
bribes, a small oil trader operating in Russia or Switzerland might be more willing to do so.
Therefore, if greater underpricing was in fact associated with greater bribes, we should see a
larger fraction of oil sold to obscure oil traders during periods when underpricing was more
prevalent.25
The top panel in Figure 8 shows the estimated total amount of illegal revenues, by
period. 26 Most of the illegal revenues were obtained between 2000 and 2001. The middle
panel presents the fraction of buyers of Iraqi oil that are individual traders (as opposed to
corporations, both major and minor). This fraction is low in the years before 2000, and
grows with time. It reaches a peak in the rst trimester of 2001, and declines after that. A
comparison with the top panel indicates that the rst trimester of 2001 is the time when
underpricing of Basrah reached its peak. The correlation between the degree of underpricing
and the fraction of buyers that are individuals is .48. The bottom panel shows what fraction
of buyers of Iraqi oil that are major oil companies, dened as the ones listed among the top
200 oil companies in the world. (Not all the companies are major oil companies, so that
the fraction of major oil companies is not 1 minus the fraction of individual traders.) A
large fraction of buyers are major oil companies in the earlier years of the program when
underpricing was less prevalent. The share of major oil companies decline over time. Notably,
there are no major oil companies among the oil buyers in the rst trimester of 2001, which
is exactly when underpricing reached its peak. The correlation between underpricing and
the fraction of buyers that are major oil corporations is -.42.
6 Estimating the Total Amount of Bribes to Iraq
In this nal section, we aim to quantify the amount of bribes that the Iraqi government
may have received from this underpricing mechanism. Our best estimate of underpricing
(based on the gap between the ocial price of Iraqi oil and the market price of the same
oil) suggests that the rents generated through underpricing totaled $3.5 billion.27 Of course,
not all this revenue ends up in Iraqi coers. Presumably, the buyers (at least some of them)
demand a share of the illegal revenues.
We have no direct information on the intermediary's share. However, we can use a
simple monopolistic competition framework to estimate the split of the rents between the
intermediary and the Iraqi regime. Specically, if the demand for oil provided by each trader
is isoelastic, the market price will simply be a constant markup over the the trader's marginal
25 The likelihood that the third type of buyers was willing to pay bribes is probably in between the
likelihood for the rst and the second type.
26 The evidence on buyers is based on data provided by the CIA's Iraq Survey Group (CIA 2004), which
lists the buyers of Iraqi oil in each 3-6 months period. The largest number of contracts went to Russian
traders. See Hsieh and Moretti (2005) for descriptive statistics.
27 That is, the total rent is the sum of the two entries in the bottom row in Table 2.
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official + Bribe) (5)
Here,  is the markup over marginal cost and is equal to  1
 where  is the elasticity of
substitution between traders. The important thing to notice about this expression is that
the trader's marginal cost is the sum of the ocial price of Iraqi oil and the bribe paid to
Iraq to obtain the underpriced oil. Therefore, if one knows the markup, the total amount of
bribes obtained by Iraq could be estimated as
X
t
Bribet =
X
t
[
(Pt   ^ ) + (1   )P official

]  (Qt  t) (6)
where t is the fraction of the relevant oil in week t that was bought by buyers willing to pay
bribes. Here, we use the fact that we estimate P market  P official as (Pt   ^ ) (equation 3).
We have no direct information on the mark-up charged by traders of Iraqi crude oil.
However, we can get an approximate estimate by examining evidence on the standard markup
charged by crude oil traders. The 1997 US Service Census indicates that the markup of crude
oil traders is 1.6 percent.28 We therefore use  = 1:016 as our central estimate. This implies
a very high elasticity of substitution between traders ( = 62), which is consistent with the
fact that oil is commodity. However, it is possible that the elasticity of substitution is lower
than that implied by a markup of 1.6 percent. For this reason, we also provide alternative
estimates of the total bribes under dierent assumptions on the size of .
In Table 4 we present estimates of equation 6 under dierent assumptions on  and .
Our central estimate of the split of the $3.5 billion dollar rent between trader prots and
bribes paid to Iraq (rst entry in column 1) assumes that the dealers' mark-up is 1.6% and
that  = 1. In this case, the total amount of bribes obtained by Iraq would be $2.60 billion,
or 75% of the total rent. If the dealers' mark-up was instead 3% or 5%, the total amount of
bribes obtained by Iraq would be lower.
However, not all buyers may have been willing to pay bribes. As we argue above, major
oil companies may be concerned about their reputation and may nd it dicult to pay
bribes. Entries in column 2 show estimates of the amount of bribes obtained by Iraq under
the assumption that only individual traders not aliated with oil companies are willing
to pay bribes. Those entries are obtained by applying equation 6, where t is estimated
as the fraction of buyers who are individual traders in the relevant period of the Oil for
Food Program. Note that under this scenario, the major oil companies that were allocated
contracts for underpriced Iraqi oil get to keep the entire rent. Individual traders, on the
other hand, would buy Iraqi oil below market price, resell it at market price, but would
have to split the rent with the Iraqi regime. Obviously the Iraqi regime would prefer to deal
only with individual traders. But it is possible that, in some periods, the supply of Iraqi oil
exceeded the demand from traders that were willing to pay bribes to purchase underpriced
28 U.S. Census Bureau (2001). We dene crude oil traders as \agents, brokers, and commission merchants
for petroleum wholesale" (NAICS code 42272).
17oil. Alternatively, it is possible that Iraq felt compelled to deal at least in part with reputable
oil companies to minimize international scrutiny.
Based on the estimates in column 2, the total amount of bribes obtained by Iraq would
be between $0.47 billion and $1.3 billion, depending on the dealer's mark-up. Because 1.6%
is our best guess of the magnitude of the mark-up, our estimate in row 1 provides our best
estimate of the bribes obtained by Iraq: $1.3 billion. The estimated bribes amount to 2%
of the total value of oil sales during the Oil for Food Program. Compared to the amount
of corruption typically observed in projects in some developing countries, a 2% of funds
lost to corruption does not appear to be particularly large.29 However, it is possible that
there were other irregularities in the Oil for Food Program that allowed Iraq to siphon funds
from the program. For example, it is possible that over-billing took place in the purchase of
humanitarian goods. We do not measure this in this paper, as we do not have a tractable
way of measuring its magnitude. For this reason, the 2% gure should be interpreted as a
lower bound.
How does our estimate of the total amount of bribes compare with the existing estimates?
The CIA (2004) estimates that Iraq obtained $230 million in bribes. This estimate is based
on documentation provided by Iraq's state owned oil company on the cash bribes paid by
the oil buyers.30 However, there are several reasons to believe that the CIA's data might
understate the amount of the illegal cash payments. First, bribes may have also been paid
to other branches of the Iraqi government (other than the oil company) and to Iraqi ocials
on a personal basis. The CIA estimate would miss these bribes. Second, the source of the
CIA's data { Iraq's oil company { has an obvious incentive to minimize the extent of the
bribes. This is a common problem with all self-reported data on illegal activities.
More importantly, it is possible that some of recipients of the oil contracts (or their
associates) compensated Iraq with political favors instead of monetary bribes. If Iraq was
compensated by some buyers in the form of political favors, the CIA's estimate would under-
state the degree by which Iraqi oil was underpriced and, by extension, the illegal resources
that Iraq might have been able to obtain through this scheme. For example, the head of the
Oil for Food program is alleged to have obtained oil allocations for a shell company called
AMEP. In exchange, the Iraqis wanted assistance in getting permission to use the Oil for
Food program funds to purchase oil-industry equipment (IIC, 2005a). In this specic exam-
ple, documentary evidence compiled by the Volcker commission indicates that a cash bribe
was paid in only one of the ve AMEP transactions and that the cash bribe equaled only
29 For example, Olken (2004a) nds that 29% of funds allocated to to a road building project in Indonesia
were stolen. In another program in Indonesia, Olken (2004b) nds that 18% of subsidized rice in a large
anti-poverty program in Indonesia is stolen. A study of hospital procurement in Argentina nds a 15%
overcharging for inputs (Di Tella and Schargrodsky, 2003). A study of Uganda schools nds that 80% of the
funds allocated by the Ministry of Education for schools never reached the schools (Reinikka and Svensson,
2004).
30 The Volcker Commission (IIC, 2005b) provides similar estimates based on the same data. The GAO
(2004) estimates that Iraq obtained almost $900 million in bribes. However, the GAO's estimate is not based
on any evidence, but simply assumes that Iraq collected a 50 cent bribe on every barrel of oil.
18a tenth of the rent generated by underpricing. In contrast, we remind the reader that our
estimates are remarkably consistent with the Volcker commission's documentary evidence of
underpricing in the AMEP oil sales. Therefore, our estimates based on the price gap are
arguably a more accurate measure of the sum of the monetary bribes and the monetary value
of the political favors that Iraq obtained through the deliberate underpricing of its oil.
7 Conclusion
In this paper, we nd modest evidence that the ocial selling price of Iraqi oil was
below its market value from 1997 through 1999, but clear evidence of underpricing from
May 2000 through September 2001. In addition, there is little evidence of underpricing after
September 2001, when the UN introduced a retroactive pricing scheme that made it more
dicult for Iraq to underprice. Moreover, we nd that it was easier for Iraq to underprice
its oil in periods of high price volatility in world oil markets. This is expected, as detection
of underpricing by the UN is more dicult in periods of high volatility. As expected, the
relationship between underpricing and volatility disappears after the adoption of retroactive
pricing. We also nd a suggestive relationship between the degree of underpricing and the
composition of the buyers of Iraqi oil. Periods of underpricing were periods in which a
larger share of the oil was purchased by obscure oil traders rather than by multinational oil
companies. The peak of the underpricing occurred at a time when no major multinational
companies appear among the buyers.
Why did Iraq sell its oil below market price? We hypothesize that underpricing was a way
for the Iraq regime to obtain illegal kickbacks or political favors from the oil buyers. Because
all the legal oil revenues were controlled by the UN, the Iraq regime had an incentive to sell its
oil below its market price in exchange for a bribe from the buyer. Our estimates suggest that
Iraq created 3.5 billion dollars in rents by underpricing the oil. Using a simple monopolistic
competition framework and an estimate of the elasticity of substitution between traders,
we calculate that illegally received 1.3 billion dollars in bribes, or 2 of the oil sales under
the Oil for Food program. This estimate should be interpreted as the sum of the direct
cash payments and the monetary value of the political favors provided by the oil buyers.
Compared with the amount of corruption observed in projects in developing countries, this
estimate appears to be small.
There are a number of important questions we do not address in this paper. First, we
only focus on the bribes that Iraq might have been able to obtain through underpricing its
oil, and not on other mechanisms by which Iraq could have obtained illegal resources (for
example, over-invoicing the purchases of humanitarian goods). We focus on illicit income
from oil sales, rather than on illegal revenue from other sources, because we have a tractable
way of measuring the bribes Iraq might have been able to extract from the oil buyers.
Second, we clearly can not say much about the benet of the program. Although we nd
19evidence of underpricing, the program did provide valuable aid that signicantly alleviated
the humanitarian crisis in Iraq. Furthermore, it appears that the UN were successful in
reducing the scope of underpricing after September 2001. Indeed, it is remarkable how much
a small change in the rules of the program { specically, the introduction of retroactive
pricing { was able to reduce the scope of underpricing. Therefore, one obvious lesson from
the Oil for Food program is that incentives do matter, and careful institutional design on
the part of international development agencies is crucial to minimize the amount of waste in
humanitarian programs.
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Prior to September 2001, Iraq (with the approval of the UN's oil overseers) set the ocial
selling price of Basrah Light and Kirkuk at the end of the month. The quoted prices are
\free on board" (fob) prices for loadings in Ceyhan in Turkey (Kirkuk) or at Mina-ak-Bahr
(now renamed as Basrah) in the Persian Gulf (Basrah Light) and apply to oil liftings over
the subsequent month. The price of Iraqi oil is set as xed discount to dated Brent for oil
shipped to European markets, as a discount to second-month West Texas Intermediate for
shipments to the US, and as a discount to an average of Oman and Dubai for exports to Asia.
There are two implications from the use of this pricing formula. First, the fob price clearly
can dier depending on the destination of the oil. Second, although the pricing formula is
known at the beginning of the month, the exact price is not. Specically, because second
month WTI refers to the price of WTI in the rst day of the second month after the oil is
loaded, the nal price of oil shipped to the US is only known one month after the oil has
been lifted from an Iraqi prot. In turn, dated Brent refers to the price of Brent no more
than 7 days in the future, the nal price of oil shipped to Europe is known 7 days after the
oil has been shipped from Turkey. After September 2001, the exact discount to the price of
the benchmark oils was only set at the end of the month, so the buyers of Iraqi oil would
not even know the pricing formula at the time the oil is lifted.
Starting in September 1998, the UN reports the average ocial selling price of Iraqi
crude oil each week.31 The UN does not provide information on the individual prices of
the two Iraqi crude oils, nor does it provide the fob prices for the dierent markets. For
this reason, we obtained the ocial selling price of the two Iraqi crude oils from Platts.32
Because Basrah Light is typically exported to the US, we take the ocial selling price for
Basrah Light destined for the US. In turn, Kirkuk is largely exported to Europe, so we take
the ocial selling price of Kirkuk destined for European markets.
We compare the ocial selling price of Iraqi oil with the market price of Arabian Light
and Arabian Medium (Saudi Arabia) and Urals (Russia). The oil industry press frequently
cites \Arab Light", a crude oil produced by Saudi Arabia, as the closest substitute for Basrah
Light. In turn, a Russian crude oil known as \Urals" is widely viewed as a close substitute of
Kirkuk. We dene the price of the two Saudi crude oils as the fob price in the Persian Gulf
(from ICIS-LOR, obtained from Datastream's database). In turn, the market price of Urals is
typically quoted as a delivered (or cif) price in Italy (also from ICIS-LOR, provided through
Datastream). We convert the delivered price of Urals in Italy to a fob price by subtracting
oil tanker rates from the Black Sea to Italy33 The average transportation cost used for Urals
between 1989 and 2002 is $.87. During the program years, transportation costs uctuate
between .58 in 1999 and 1.22 in 2000. Transportation costs are slightly higher during the
Oil for Food program years. A regression of transportation cost on a dummy equal 1 for the
Oil for Food years yields .10 (.04). Transportation costs are also positively correlated with
the price of oil.
31 Available from http://www.un.org/Depts/oip.
32 We purchased this data from Platts. There are no price data is 1995 and 1996, because no trading took
place. The data from the UN match reasonably well the properly weighted data from Platts for the years
when both sources are available (mid 1998-2002).
33 For the years 1991-2002, we use weekly shipping data from Bloomberg. Unfortunately the Bloomberg
series is not available prior to 1991. For the years 1987-1990, we use the monthly series from the annual
issues of OPEC's Statistical Bulletin (OPEC). We could not nd monthly level data for 1985 and 1986. We
impute transportation costs in 1985 and 1986 based on the mean transportation cost observed between 1987
and 1990.Turning to the market price of the Iraqi oils, we combine data from three sources to
obtain the spot market price of Basrah Light and Kirkuk. These three sources are ICIS-
LOR, Platts, and Petroleum Argus.34 For Kirkuk, oil traders will sell the oil contracts to the
end users on a fob basis in Turkey. The end user will then be responsible for dispatching a
tanker to Turkey to load the oil. The market price for Kirkuk provided by all three sources
are therefore spot fob prices for loadings at the port of Ceyhan (in Turkey.) For Basrah
Light, oil-traders typically sell the oil on a delivered basis in the US Gulf Coast. Therefore,
ICIS-LOR and Petroleum Argus reports the cif price at the US Gulf Coast. We convert the
cif price to a fob price by subtracting the shipping rates for crude oil from the Persian Gulf
to the US Gulf Coast.35 Platts also reports the cif price of Basrah Light in the US Gulf
Coast, but our sources that report Platts' data already adjust the cif price for shipping costs
from the Persian Gulf. Unfortunately, no individual source for spot prices covers the entire
period. To construct a series for the spot market price of the two Iraqi crude oils over the
entire time period, we take the average of the price gaps from the data sources available in
each week. We choose a simple average as the most transparent way of combining the three
alternative series.
Finally, the website of the UN Oil for Food program reports the weekly quantity of oil
sold. Starting in mid-1998, this data is reported separately for exports through Ceyhan
(Turkey) and Mina-ak-Bahr (on the Persian Gulf) for most weeks, but there are many weeks
in which this breakdown is not provided publicly.
34 The data from Petroleum Argus is obtained from weekly issues of \Petroleum Argus Weekly Global
Markets." We obtained Platts data on the spot price of Iraqi oil from OPEC's annual statistical bulletin
and weekly issues of the Energy Information Administration's \Weekly Petroleum Status Report." Finally,
we purchased data on the spot prices of the two Iraqi oils from ICIS-LOR.
35 We obtained weekly series on shipping costs from the Persian Gulf to the US Gulf Coast from Bloomberg.Table 1: Dierence Between the Market Price of Close Competitors and the ocial selling Price of Iraqi Oils
Arabian Light Arabian Medium Urals
- Basrah - Basrah - Kirkuk
(1) (2) (3)
Model 1: Overall Estimates
Dierence for 1997-2002 - Dierence for 1980-1995 2.44** 1.24** 0.69**
(0.25) (0.34) (0.18)
Model 2: Estimates by Period
Dierence for 1997-1999 - Dierence for 1980-1995 2.07** 0.84** 0.53**
(0.18) (0.24) (0.15)
Dierence for 2000-2001 - Dierence for 1980-1995 3.91** 2.67** 1.07**
(0.41) (0.61) (0.40)
Dierence for 2002 - Dierence for 1980-1995 0.68 -0.40 0.45
(0.36) (0.49) (0.29)
Total Revenue from Underpricing (billion) 4.12 2.28 0.76
Notes: Standard errors in parenthesis. The dependent variable is the dierence between the price of the closest competitor and the ocial selling
price of the relevant Iraqi crude oil, in dollars per barrel. The entry in row 1 is the coecient on a dummy equal 1 for observations during
the Oil for Food Program (between the 10th week of 1997 and the last week of 2002). The excluded category includes observations before the
Oil for Food Program (between 1980 and 1996). The level of observation is a week. Entries in rows 2 to 4 are from one regression, and are
coecients on dummies equal 1 for observations during the stated period. The error structure is assumed to be autocorrelated up to ve lags and
heteroskedastic. The entry in the bottom row is obtained by multiplying the amount of the relevant Iraqi oil sold in each week between 1997 and
2002 by the dierence between the price dierence observed in each week between 1997 and 2002 and the average price dierence for the period
1980-1995. (See Equation 4). Sample size in columns 1 to 3 is, respectively, 785, 667 and 690.Table 2: Dierence Between the Market Price of Iraqi Olis and the ocial selling Price of Iraqi Oils
Basrah Market Price Kirkuk Market Price
- Basrah Ocial Selling Price - Kirkuk Ocial Selling Price
(1) (2)
Model 1: Overall Estimates
Dierence for 1997-2002 - Dierence for 1980-1995 1.64** 0.29**
(0.20) (0.12)
Model 2: Estimates by Period
Dierence for 1997-1999 - Dierence for 1980-1995 0.85** 0.33**
(0.15) (0.13)
Dierence for 2000-2001 - Dierence for 1980-1995 2.82** 0.40*
(0.24) (0.21)
Dierence for 2002 - Dierence for 1980-1995 1.46** - 0.03
(0.22) (0.21)
Total Revenue from Underpricing (billion) 3.03 0.48
Notes: Standard errors in parenthesis. The dependent variable is the dierence between the market price of an Iraqi crude oil and the ocial
selling price of the same Iraqi crude, in dollars per barrel. The entry in row 1 is the coecient on a dummy equal 1 for observations during
the Oil for Food Program (between the 10th week of 1997 and the last week of 2002). The excluded category includes observations before the
Oil for Food Program (between 1980 and 1996). The level of observation is a week. Entries in rows 2 to 4 are from one regression, and are
coecients on dummies equal 1 for observations during the stated period. The error structure is assumed to be autocorrelated up to ve lags and
heteroskedastic. The entry in the bottom row is obtained by multiplying the amount of the relevant Iraqi oil sold in each week between 1997 and
2002 by the dierence between the price dierence observed in each week between 1997 and 2002 and the average price dierence for the period
1980-1995. (See Equation 4). Sample size in columns 1 and 2 is, respectively, 458 and 487.
2
5Table 3: The Relationship Between Underpricing and the Volatility of World Oil Prices
Basrah Kirkuk
(1) (2)
Before Retroactive Pricing
Coe. on Std. Dev. of Price of Brent 0.916** 0.306**
(0.094) (0.084)
After Retroactive Pricing
Coe. on Std. Dev. of Price of Brent 0.190 -0.067
(0.176) (0.191)
Notes: Standard errors in parenthesis. Each entry is from a separate regression. The dependent
variable is the estimated underpricing by week. The independent variable is the standard deviation
of the price of Brent in the 10 weeks preceding the relevant week. Estimates in row 1 are based
on a sample that includes weeks before the introduction of retroactive pricing (September 2001).
Estimates in row 2 are based on a sample that includes weeks after the introduction of retroactive
pricing. The error structure is assumed to be autocorrelated up to ve lags and heteroskedastic.
The unit of measurement for both the dependent and independent variable is dollar per barrel.
26Table 4: Estimated Amount of Bribes Obtained by Iraq from Underpricing
If All Buyers If Only Individual
Pay Bribes Traders Pay Bribes
( = 1) ( is estimated)
Iraqi Bribes Iraqi Share of Iraqi Bribes Iraqi Share of
(billion) Total Rent (billion) Total Rent
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dealer's markup is 1.6% 2.64 75% 1.30 76%
Dealer's markup is 3% 1.82 52% 0.95 51%
Dealer's markup is 5% 0.78 22% 0.47 28%
Notes: Entries in column 1 and 3 are estimates of equation 6. Underpricing is estimated using the
dierence between the market price of Iraqi oil and the ocial selling price of Iraqi oil. Entries in
column 3 are obtained by estimating  as the fraction of buyers that are individual traders in the
relevant phase of the Oil for Food Program.
27Figure 1: Dierence Between the Market Price of Close Substitutes and the Ocial Selling
Price of Iraqi Oils
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Notes: The top panel shows the dierence between the market price of Arabian Light and
the ocial selling price of Basrah. Arabian Light is the closest substitute of Basrah. The
bottom panel shows the dierence between the market price of Urals and the ocial selling
price of Kirkuk. Urals is the closest substitute of Kirkuk. The rst vertical line marks the
beginning of the Oil for Food Program. The second vertical line indicates the beginning of
retroactive pricing. The horizontal line is the average dierence for the years before the Oil
for Food Program. Iraqi oil was not traded in 1991-1993 due to the rst Gulf War; and in
1995-1997 due to delays in the Oil for Food Program.
28Figure 2: Underpricing and Bribes
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Notes: The equilibrium spot price and quantity are P market, and Q. The ocial price paid
by the oil traders is P official. The shaded area is the total amount of illegal rents. These
rents are presumably split between Iraq and the traders.
29Figure 3: Dierence Between the Market Price of Iraqi Oils and the Ocial Selling Price of
Iraqi Oils
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Notes: The top panel shows the dierence between the market price of Basrah and the ocial
selling price of Basrah. The bottom panel shows the dierence between the market price of
Kirkuk and the ocial selling price of Kirkuk. The rst vertical line marks the beginning
of the Oil for Food Program. The second vertical line indicates the beginning of retroactive
pricing. The horizontal line is the average dierence for the years before the Oil for Food
Program. Iraqi oil was not traded in 1991-1993 due to the rst Gulf War; and in 1995-1997
due to delays in the Oil for Food Program.
30Figure 4: The Relationship Between Newspaper Coverage of Iraq and Underpricing
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Notes: In the top panel, the line with circles shows the number of articles that contain the word "Iraq" published in the New York Times and
the Wall Street Journal, by month. The solid line shows the estimated underpricing, by month (based on the dierence between market price and
OSP of Basrah.) The scale on the y-axis refer to the number of articles. A regression of underpricing on number of articles yields -.001 (.001).
In the middle panel, the line with circles shows the number of articles that contain the words "Iraq" and "Weapons" published in the New York
Times and the Wall Street Journal, by month. A regression of underpricing on number of articles yields -.030 (.023). In the bottom panel, the
line with circles shows the number of articles that contain the words "Iraq" and "Human Rights" published in the New York Times and the Wall
Street Journal, by month. A regression of underpricing on number of articles yields -.005 (.003).
31Figure 5: The Relationship Between Delays at Iraqi Ports and Underpricing
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Notes: The line with circles shows the average waiting time (in days) experinced by tankers loading
oil at the Basrah oil terminal, by month. The solid line shows the estimated underpricing, by month
(based on the dierence between market price and OSP of Basrah.) The scale on the y-axis refer
to days of waiting time. A regression of underpricing on waiting time yields -.40 (.23). A graph
based on the ration of waiting time divided by the number of ships loading oil in the relevant month
generates very similar picture.
32Figure 6: The Relationship Between Unspent Funds and Underpricing
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Notes: The line for "Unspent Funds" represents the fraction of revenues that is not spent for
humanitarian aid in Iraq in each 6-months period over the total oil revenues in that period.
33Figure 7: Quantity of Iraqi Oil Sold and Underpricing of Iraqi Oil
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Notes: The top gure shows the quantity of Basrah oil sold and the dierence between the market
price of its closest competitor, Arabian Light, and the ocial selling price of Basrah. A larger price
dierence means a larger underpricing of Basrah. A regression of quantity sold on the price gap
yields a coecient (std error) of -2.17 (.4.00). The bottom gure shows the quantity of Kirkuk oil
sold and the dierence between the market price of its closest competitor, Urals , and the ocial
selling price of Kirkuk. A larger price dierence means a larger underpricing of Kirkuk. A regression
of quantity sold on the price gap yields a coecient (std error) of -8.61 (4.34).
34Figure 8: The Relationship Between Illegal Revenues and Type of Buyers.
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Notes: In the top panel, each bar shows the estimated total amount of illegal revenues, in each
period. In the middle panel, each bar shows what fraction of the buyers of Iraqi oil are individuals
(as opposed to corporations). In the bottom panel, each bar shows what fraction of buyers of Iraqi
oil are one of the 200 major oil companies (as dened by Forbes, 2004). The correlation between
the top and the middle panel is .48. The correlation between the top and the bottom panel is -.42. 35